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Telling Government What's Right
Paul R. Dimond*
Suing Government' offers a carefully argued and provocative analy-
sis of official wrongs and citizen remedies. Peter Schuck surveys the
field from two perspectives; private tort law with the goal of promot-
ing compensation of victims, and from that of organization theory,
with the aim of modifying illegal behavior of government personnel.
From these vantage points, Schuck identifies several problem areas
on the contemporary legal landscape.
First, current immunity doctrine, although designed both to pro-
mote vigorous decision-making by officials and to protect state trea-
suries, is incompatible with the need to compensate victims of
official wrong doing.2 Second, personal damages against officials
are ineffective in correcting wrongdoing by government personnel;
such damage awards merely encourage abdication of official respon-
sibility by making inaction less risky than action.3 Injunctions, par-
ticularly structural injunctions, generally are inadequate to alter
bureaucratic behavior and inappropriate for securing governmental
reform.4
Based on these findings, Schuck proposes a fundamental change
in judicial imposition of remedies for governmental wrongs. First,
he proposes a system of enterprise liability to compensate victims
for official wrong-doing: Damages would be assessed against the
budgetary unit of government with the most direct control over the
wrong, and not against specific officials. 5 Second, he advocates use
of internal disciplinary controls to change officials' behavior. 6 Fi-
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nally, he urges judges to proceed with extreme caution in issuing
any form of injunctive relief, saving the structural injunction for the
rarest circumstances and issued then only in the form of general
guidelines and not detailed prescriptions. 7 Such sweeping reform
of the remedial landscape, Schuck suggests, is best effected by legis-
latures, primarily Congress, rather than the courts.8
Two kinds of questions arise from Schuck's analysis. Part I of this
Review Essay considers issues that emerge within the analytic frame-
work of private tort law and organizational theory chosen by Schuck.
Part II discusses issues that arise from Schuck's failure to consider
the broader perspectives of public law and public values. By paying
little heed to the role courts can play in shaping and giving voice to
widely held values (even in cases where courts are not well suited to
realize those values), Schuck deprives his proposed reforms of a cru-
cial legitimating force. The value of technical virtue, if not coupled
with some declaration of public values, cannot reshape the realities
of the relations between individual and state in an advanced
bureaucracy.
I. Issues Emerging Within the Perspective of Private Tort Law and
Organizational Theory
Even if one wholeheartedly accepts the twin perspectives of pri-
vate tort law and organizational theory as the proper ones for ap-
proaching the subject, one can question Schuck's analyses and
conclusions. The forms of Schuck's arguments are too easily
manipulated by those seeking to implement value choices that are
not (and need not be) stated within Schuck's framework. Indeed,
very similar analyses could lead to conclusions that he would find
distressing. For example, the claim that substituting enterprise lia-
bility for individual liability would enhance the rigor of bureaucratic
decision-making loses much of its force when we realize that rule-
makers (be they courts or legislatures) could adopt Schuck's views
on the inappropriateness of personal liability but reject his views on
governmental liability. It seems quite plausible that, at least in par-
ticular cases, a rule-maker might conclude that the cost to the states
of establishing disciplinary procedures simply outweighed the po-
tential for individual harm. This conclusion, coupled with an ac-
ceptance of Schuck's argument that the threat of personal liability
leads to official inaction would leave us with a system of state offi-
7. pp. 147-196.
8. pp. 196-198.
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cials free to act vigorously to violate people's rights and states im-
mune from compensating the victims of such official abuse.
Similarly, Schuck's suggestion that internal disciplinary and man-
agement controls could be instituted that would be more effective
than injunctions in transforming official behavior is at least as debat-
able. A governmental entity might well choose to continue the
wrongful conduct, and to pay the price of any damage awards that
would issue from local juries, but refuse to impose any internal dis-
ciplinary controls or to reform the illegal behavior of its officers. In
the absence of some form ofjudicial injunction, such a policy would
come cheaply if jurors tended to favor the specific wrong at issue.
I am also not persuaded that the goal of promoting vigorous deci-
sion-making compels us to relieve individual officials of personal lia-
bility in all cases, particularly when the harm to the citizen is
intentional. Although the governmental unit is best suited to com-
pensate the victim of official wrong, that victim should be able to
seek punitive damages against officials in appropriate cases.9 At
some point protecting individual officials from all damage awards
conjures up images of a faceless bureaucracy, where some "Big
Brother" may bear ultimate responsibility but individual officers go
nameless and blameless. We want to discourage the vigorous viola-
tion of rights, even while encouraging vigorous decision-making.
Finally, many of Schuck's challenges to the decision-making ca-
pacity of federal courts are questionable. For example, Schuck ar-
gues that courts can deal with "adjudicative" but not "social"
facts. 0 He claims that courts cannot communicate with governmen-
tal officials, bureaucrats, and the people as well as other institutions
can. " He argues that there is too large a factual "chasm" between
the violation proven and the remedy ordered by courts.' 2 Although
9. Cf. Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1637 (1983) ("reckless or callous disregard
[by a government official of another person's] rights, as well as intentional violations of
federal law, should be sufficient to trigger a jury's consideration of the appropriateness
of punitive damages.")
10. Pp. 156-158. But see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-68 (1964) (outlining
social consequences of vote dilution); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493-
95 (1954) (rejecting systematic use of segregation to humiliate blacks); and Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1880) (discussing prejudice to black defendants
caused by exclusion of blacks from juries).
11. pp. 161-63.
12. p. 156. But see Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (refusing to
issue order mandating immediate remedy of violation against even named plaintiffs).
Indeed, the Burger Court's most surrealistic jurisprudential adventures have arisen
when attempting to limit the concept of the underlying violation to the incremental ex-
tent to which particular defendants exacerbate underlying conditions in any community.
See, e.g., Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
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each of these propositions may have some merit in some types of
cases, they all seem overstated to add support to his particular pro-
posals for restructuring remedies.' 3 Given the scope of Schuck's
analysis and his sweeping proposal for reform of the remedial struc-
ture of redressing official deprivation of citizen rights, these are only
"minor quibbles."' 4 If the legal, political and social landscape of
today and tomorrow were limited to private tort law and bureau-
cratic organization, Schuck's book would be due great acclaim as a
persuasive proposal for comprehensive reform in the way we think
about personal rights and remedying official wrongs.
II. Issues arising From the Perspective of Public Law and Public Values
The landscape, however, is not so limited. In another review,
Cass Sunstein has pointed out the shift from private to public con-
ceptions of tort law in an age of affirmative governmental responsi-
bility.' 5 This development provides a third, and perhaps more
cogent, perspective from which suits against government should be
evaluated. This perspective demands careful attention in consider-
ing the appropriate framework for remedying official wrongs.
Rather than recap Sunstein's exploration of this public law per-
spective, which serves to justify the propriety of the structural in-
junction in a broad set of circumstances,' 6 let me add a fourth
13. In contrast, Schuck's discussion of the need to avoid detail in structural injunc-
tions and to promote the governmental defendant's exercise of choice in implementing
even comprehensive remedy is most inciteful. See pp. 190-192. Such pragmatic rules for
understanding the strengths and weaknesses ofjudicial power need not be prescriptions
for default by the courts, even in the most complex and controversial cases. In the Wil-
mington school case, for example, District Judge Murray Schwartz exercised such re-
straint in directing state and local defendants to design and implement an effective and
equitable metropolitan school desegregation plan. See Evans v. Buchanan, 435 F.Supp.
832 (D. Del. 1977), 447 F.Supp. 982 (D. Del. 1978), 447 F.Supp. 1041 (D. Del. 1978),
468 F.Supp. 944 (D. Del. 1978), 512 F.Supp. 839 (D. Del. 1981) arfd in part and vacated in
part, 582 F.2d 750 (3rd Cir. 1978). One retrospective analysis suggests that Judge
Schwartz's care and caution were critical to the relative efficacy of the remedy in prac-
tice. SeeJ. RAFFEL, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1981). A final irony in this
example, however, is that Justice Rehnquist's hostility to the right at issue apparently
was blinding: he argued that Judge Schwartz had imposed a "draconian" remedy and
treated the State and local school boards like a "railroad in reorganization." See Dela-
ware Board of Education v. Evans, 446 U.S. 923, 926 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). The course of the entire case is discussed in P. DIMOND, BE-
YOND BUSING 283-339, 347-361, 388-393 (forthcoming 1985).
14. Sunstein,Judicial Relief and Public Tort Law, 92 YALE L.J. 749, 755-57 (1983). See
also, Symposium Issue, 32 AI. L. REV. (1981).
15. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 757-58.
16. Id. at 759-61. For general discussions of the differences between traditional con-
ceptions of private law adjudication and newer understandings of public law litigation,
see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976);
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perspective, one emphasizing the transformative power of public
values voiced landmark of legislation and judicial decision. The
view from this vantage point warns us against the danger of concen-
trating long and hard on technical questions regarding the imple-
mentation of assumed goals, while ignoring critical questions about
basic value choices. This perspective has implications both for
Schuck's discussion of damages and his treatment of injunctions.
A. Damages, State Immunity, and State Responsibility
Consider first the question of state liability for damage awards.
Schuck's proposal for governmental liability fails with respect to
state violation of federal rights unless courts can award damages
against the states. If the states choose not to permit such damage
awards in state courts, then the the eleventh amendment doctrine of
sovereign immunity, as judicially developed, must be limited by
Congress or the Court in order to achieve Schuck's proposal for
governmental liability. Although Schuck does criticize current elev-
enth amendment immunity doctrine,' 7 his analysis fails to explore
the struggles over the meaning of our federalism that led to the ex-
pansion of the eleventh amendment in Hans v. Louisiana.'8 Recon-
struction had ended on a sorry note with the retrenchment from
national power that spawned the Supreme Court's abdication to the
doctrine of state sovereignty in a variety of cases. 19 In the following
decades, however, the Court proceeded to limit this doctrine in or-
der to permit federal court supervision of state regulation of the
economy and capitalist prerogatives.20 Ex Parte Young 2' provided
the necessary fiction: State officials act as private persons for pur-
poses of the eleventh amendment when they violate their duties
under the fourteenth amendment. They are therefore subject to
Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982); Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
17. pp. 44-46, 118-119.
18. 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (eleventh amendment bars all suits by private citizens against
their own state). By its literal terms the eleventh amendment bars only suits against a
state by a citizen of a foreign state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
19. See, e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (upholding state grant of
monopoly over slaughterhouses); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (dis-
missing criminal prosecution against state official for civil rights violations); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking down Civil Rights Act of 1875); and Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding "separate but equal" standard in segregation
cases).
20. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state law estab-
lishing limits on length of work day and work week).
21. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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federal court injunctions enforcing the dictates of the fourteenth
amendment.
But should any state which is under a federal constitutional duty
not be subject as a state to an individual's suit in federal court for
violation of that duty?22 Why, indeed, should Congress be required
to issue a clear statement that states are liable as states for such vio-
lations before federal courts may issue damage awards against the
states if the federal court already has jurisdiction over the entire
case? 23 Surely, the legal landscape surrounding the adoption of the
eleventh amendment does not provide the answer in the face of the
revolution in our federalism that accompanied adoption of the four-
teenth amendment and passage of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, the
1875 Civil Rights Act, and the 1875 general federal question juris-
diction statute. 24
The Burger Court's decisional rules in Edelman v. Jordan,25 Fitzpat-
rick v. Bitzer,26 and Quern v. Jordan2 7 seem at best poor rationaliza-
tions to keep the post-Reconstruction Court's doctrine of state
sovereignty alive in the face of a quite different constitutional man-
date.28 The modern Court did, after all, reject post-Reconstruction
22. But see Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (upholding injunction in prison
reform suit but striking State and Board of Corrections as defendants). Ex Parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347 (1880) seemed to have a more affirmative vision of State
responsibility to meet federal duties imposed by the fourteenth amendment. But, then,
the promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-308 (1880), that the Four-
teenth Amendment might protect blacks from caste subjugation, soon fell to judicial
legalization of Jim Crow. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-552 (1896).
23. The difficult issue for the framers of the Reconstruction legislation was not
whether the states were liable as states for the violation of citizens' civil rights, but rather
how far down the line of state subdivisions (e.g., municipalities, individual officers and
private persons) federal law could go in securing federal right in the event of state de-
fault. See Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts,
73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964).
24. 16 Stat. 40, 433 (1871 Act); 18 Stat. 335 (1875 Act); 28 U.S.C. 1331 (general
federal question statute. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-242 (1972)
(describing "the basic alteration in our federal system wrought in the Reconstruction era
through federal legislation and constitutional amendment . . . The very purpose . . .
was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of
the people's federal rights.") See also Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of
Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist
Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV. 462, 470-471 (1980).
25. 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (federal courts may not order retroactive damage awards
against state treasury).
26. 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Congress may authorize retroactive damage awards under
section five of the Fourteenth amendment).
27. 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (federal court may order state to pay for notice of decision
to members of plaintiff class but may not authorize retroactive damage awards under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 absent clear Congressional intent to remove immunity cases).
28. See, e.g., Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpre-
tation, 83 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1889 (1983) (eleventh amendment merely a response to
post-revolutionary war debts). The post-Reconstruction vision of state autonomy is also
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doctrines in other areas. For example, in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co. 2 9
and Brown v. Board of Education,30 the Warren Court overturned the
post-Reconstruction Court's readings of the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments in the Civil Rights Cases3' and Plessy v. Ferguson3 2
Indeed, the real puzzle is why the jurisprudence of Hans v. Louisiana
and the Ex Parte Young fiction still so dominates our current thinking
about constitutional violations and equitable remedies, as well as
state immunity from damage awards.33
Unless and until the value of state responsibility to meet federal
duties supersedes the value of federal court deference to the doc-
trine of state sovereignty, neither the Congress nor the Court will
seriously consider adopting Schuck's proposal of state liability for
damages for state violation of citizen rights. Yet Schuck largely ig-
nores the pitched battle being fought within the Burger Court over
this very issue.3 4
evident in the abstention doctrine expounded in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1977);
and in the heightened standing requirements for plaintiffs seeking injunctive reformula-
tions of state bureaucratic procedures; see, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
The Court has occasionally moved away from this vision. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267 (1977) (upholding injunction ordering state to expend additional funds on
public education to remedy unlawful segregation). Most recently the Court has evinced
an almost complete lack of desire to protect state autonomy from the federal legislative
process. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority, 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (Feb. 19,
1985) overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Fair Labor
Standards Act may constitutionally be applied to states and their subdivisions).
29. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33. Nevertheless, Professor Tribe defends the fiction, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 133 (1978), and calls the naming of a state as defendant for violating its
duties under the Fourteenth Amendment just a "gross pleading error." Id. Unfortu-
nately, the jurisprudential perspective of the Ex Parte Young fiction remains focused on
the individual wrong and not on the state's responsibility to protect the constitutional
rights of citizens.
34. Justice Brennan's challenge in dissent to Edelman and his modification for the
Court of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (allowing Section 1983 actions against
municipal official only in individual capacity) in Monell v. Department of Social Serv-
ices, 436 U.S. 653 (1978), can be seen as the initial steps along the road to a new under-
standing of the appropriate legal landscape - a perspective in which government as an
enterprise, as well as particular officers, owe duties to all persons. The compromise
reached in Monell, which subjected cities to liability for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
but only if the wrong-doing amounted to an official policy or custom, can be seen as a
cautious move away from the atomistic framework of Ex Parte Young and toward a more
comprehensive understanding of governmental responsibility. The battle over this
framework, however, is directly joined in the assault launched, entirely in dicta, by Rehn-
quist against Brennan in Quern; that assault is carried out under the guise of statutory
construction. See 440 U.S. at 348 ("Our cases consistently have required a clearer show-
ing of congressional purpose to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity than our
Brother BRENNAN's able to marshal.") Given Rehnquist's strong support for state dis-
cretion rather than state responsibility, it is hardly surprising that he is the staunchiest
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My point is not so much that I hold out greater hope than does
Schuck (although I do) for judicial reform of the current chaotic pat-
tern of damage remedies that amounts to nothing less than a
minefield for citizens seeking redress for governmental wrongs.
Rather, my point is that congressional reform will not be forthcom-
ing unless the fundamental issue in our federal system of state re-
sponsibility versus state discretion is directly confronted and fully
exposed. The perspectives of private tort law and administrative
bureaucracy do not shed much light on this issue that is so basic to
state liability for damages.
B. Injunctions, Remedial Limits, and Constitutional Values
The issue of injunctive relief also raises questions regarding basic
value choices. Whether and how a court confronts these choices has
strong effects on the process of translating these values into social
reality. This is true regardless of the opportunities taken or fore-
gone in any specific case. Three Supreme Court decisions that
parade under the guise of remedies-Giles v. Harris;35 the second
decision in Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown J");36 and the first
decision in Milliken v. Bradley ("Milliken I") 37-provide a good illus-
tration of this phenomenon. In Giles, plaintiffs complained that Ala-
bama had violated the fifteenth amendment by blocking some 5,000
blacks, who had previously voted, from voting in Montgomery solely
because of their race. Justice Holmes addressed the plaintiff's
claims from a private law and institutional perspective similar to that
used by Schuck. Wringing his hands over what he assumed was the
incapacity of federal courts to enjoin state election machinery,
Holmes denied the plaintiffs request for an injunction on the
ground that equity protected only property rights not civil rights
and remitted the plaintiff to a damage action in Alabama state
courts. 38 From this private law perspective Holmes could not even
defender of the atomistic views generated by the Ex Parte Young fiction. Ironically
enough, the conservative wing of the Burger Court seems, however, quite willing to
recognize the Ex Parte Young doctrine as a fiction when such a recognition will serve to
lessen state responsibility. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 104 S.
Ct. 900, 911 (1984) (eleventh amendment bars federal injunction against state officials
based on violations of state law).
35. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
36. 349 U.S. 249 (1955).
37. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
38. 189 U.S. at 486-88. Indeed, it is not surprising that Justice Holmes relied on
Hans v. Louisiana in Giles, 189 U.S. at 487-88. ([O]ne of the first questions is what [a
federal court] can do to enforce any order that it may make, [The violation here] is
alleged to be the conspiracy of the state although the state is not and could not be made
a party to the [case]. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1. The [Federal] court has no constitu-
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muster a clear declaration of the constitutional wrong inhering in
Alabama's disfranchisement of black voters. That the Supreme
Court then approved Alabama's denial of damages to the plaintiff
for this gross violation of the fifteenth amendment was only a fitting
anti-climax. 39 Black suffrage, and all that it might have meant for
the history of the country in 1903 and since, was the transforming
value at issue. Money damages were irrelevant.
Over the past two decades, the Court has posited "one-person,
one-vote" as a rule for electing our representatives and prohibited
racial exclusion of blacks from all opportunity to win elections. 40
The relative success of the judicial intrusion into this arena, long
deemed the most essential attribute of state sovereignty, provides a
counter-example to the hand-wringing of Holmes and Schuck over
the efficacy of structural injunctions. More importantly, however,
the contrast between these two eras has little to do with the affirma-
tive state, bureaucracy or private tort law. Transforming values
were at stake. In one era the Court acted to fuel the move to dis-
franchise black voters, while in the other the Court acted to end the
hegemony of some vested interests controlling elections by opening
the process of representative democracy to all citizens on a more
equal basis.
In Brown II, the Court delayed the admission of the named black
plaintiffs to whites-only schools on the express ground that the
states would need time to transform their dual system of public edu-
cation into a non-discriminatory system.41 From another quasi-pri-
vate law perspective not dissimilar to that suggested by Schuck, such
a trade-off might seem unconscionable. The Court could have is-
sued a quite specific negative injunction to prevent the whites-only
schools from obstructing the transfer of the named plaintiffs as the
tional power to control [the state's] action by any direct means. And if we leave the state
out of consideration the court has a little practical power to deal with the people of the
state in a body.") Schuck's micro-view of implementation problems and the ineffective-
ness of injunctions in transforming the behavior of "street-level" bureaucrats seems to
share some of this atomistic private law perspective of equity although he would not, of
course, limit injunctive relief to remedying deprivations of property rights given today's
legal landscape. See pp. 150-198.
39. Compare Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904) (dismissing appeal of Giles plain-
tiff's action for damages in state court; judgment below was based on adequate state
ground) with Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 20 and n. 57 (1983).
40. See generally, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); and Rogers
v. Lodge, 454 U.S. 811 (1982).
41. 349 U.S. at 300-301. See also Dimond, supra note 39, at 25 and n. 90.
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Court had previously done in the higher education cases. 42 From
Holmes' private law perspective in Giles v. Harris, no equitable rem-
edy would have been forthcoming and plaintiffs would have been
limited to damage actions when they wanted to be free from State-
imposed segregation. 43 But from the perspective of the constitu-
tional value at issue, something more than voluntary transfers and
damages was at stake-that something was nothing less than the
continued legitimacy of a system of forced racial ghettoization by
which the white majority subjugated an entire race to a subordinate
caste.4
4
There was, of course, a huge gap between the inchoate right de-
clared in the first Brown opinion ("Brown I") and the unarticulated
remedy provided in Brown I. Yet a transforming constitutional
value was given credence. In contrast to Plessy and Giles, where the
Court legitimated segregation and disfranchisement, and thereby
fueled the growth of the regime ofJim Crow caste, the bifurcation of
the "remedy" in Brown II allowed the Court to sanction something
akin to an anti-caste principle in Brown J.45 The "gap" between the
42. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (ordering black student to be
admitted to state law school).
43. Suppose that individual blacks had sought damages for violations of the Plessy
court's "equality" constraint on Jim Crow separation. How many local juries would
have awarded damages? If the legal landscape were dominated by the Plessy court's vali-
dation of forced racial segregation, we could not even conceive of such awards against
officials for implementing the state mandate of forcing blacks into unequal facilities.
Even if such damages had been awarded, they would have done nothing to free blacks of
the yoke imposed by Jim Crow.
44. See Dimond, supra note 39; note 23, at 507-511; Black, The Lawfulness of the Segre-
gation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150
(1955).
45. See Dimond, supra note 39, at 5 n. 12, 15, and 23-25 and n. 90. Schuck notes the
causal "chasm" between the details of structural injunctions and factual findings of any
violations, p. 156), criticizes the lack of any "compass" for courts in framing equitable
relief while adrift on a "sea of remedial discretion," p. 175, and argues for a tighter fit
between rights and remedies even to the extent of limiting final declarations of rights
and wrongs to conform to the difficulties of framing and implementing structural injunc-
tions. p. 176 et seq. While Schuck concedes that in rare instances the Court can issue
declarations of rights and wrongs that will transform social values, p. 167-68 (citing
Brown and the Reapportionment Cases), he argues that Courts generally should consider
the varied problems of implementing meaningful relief before making a final determina-
tion of liability. p. 168 et seq. Once again, however, Schuck's thinking on these issues
seems limited primarily to the twin perspectives of private law jurisprudence and organi-
zational theories of bureaucratic behavior. The danger is that his understanding of"in-
tegrating" hearing on violation and remedy in order to formulate the least restrictive
remedy, p. 186-196, may lead judges to legitimate continuing wrong. See, supra text
accompany notes 34-40.
Perhaps, a richer understanding of these issues could be generated by making the
perspectives of public law and transforming values more prominent. In this context,
Brown and the Reapportionment cases might look more like the paradigm rather than
the exception for judicial review by the Supreme Court; thinking on rights and wrongs
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constitutional value first declared in Brown I and the refusal to order
any specific remedy in Brown II at least served to give blacks a moral
claim to some entitlement. That claim helped to fuel the Civil
Rights Movement, symbolized by Dr. King, that began to transform
our society.46
The tragedy in all of this for the Burger Court is that its rulings in
the segregation cases should have plumbed the deepest public
meaning of the constitutional value at issue in Brown I. The Court,
instead, has reverted to a private law model of equity that seeks to
tailor the remedy to fit the nature and scope of the violation; in the
process, however, the Court has often trimmed broad violations to
fit narrow remedies that offend the majority of the body politic as
little as possible. Milliken I represented the nadir of this approach.47
Faced with the issue whether a complex system of racial ghettoiza-
tion in community life confined blacks on a caste basis to an exand-
ing blacks-only core surrounded by a receding whites-only ring, a
narrow five-person majority just avoided this critical issue. These
Justices viewed the case more as a private dispute in which plaintiffs
would be both more honest and comprehensive; gaps between declared rights and gen-
eral rather than detailed injunctions would be seen more as an institutional necessity
(and opportunity) that Courts must honestly bear and forthrightly explain in order to
"gain assent", p. 181, quoting A. BICKEL THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 251 (1964); and the Court would not seek to hide behind
the fiction that a particular, detailed structural injunction is somehow compelled in or-
der to tailor the remedy to fit the exact contours of some precisely defined violation.
From this perspective the risk that a court will avoid or limit ruling on constitutional
liability or entitlement because of its perception of remedial difficulties in practice seems
at least as great as the risk that a court will so forthrightly and fully declare constitutional
right and wrong without any regard for any remedial concerns as to make its violation
finding irrelevant. (This concept of judicial review, however, does not necessarily re-
quire the Supreme Court to be the "final arbiter" in interpreting all constitutional val-
ues. Indeed, the debate concerning tailoring remedies to fit right just ignores a core
function of law and the Court, the declaration of rights and wrongs under the Constitu-
tion. See P. DIMOND, supra note 12, at 395-402; Dimond & Sperling, Of Cultural Determin-
ism and the Limits of Law,-MicH. L. REV. - (1985) (forthcoming); Dimond, An
Exploratory Essay on Provisional Review: Toward an Alternative Form of Judicial Review,-
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. - (1985) (forthcoming).
Perhaps, my basic disagreement with Schuck arises from the different perspectives
from which we have personally experienced law - constitutional issues concerning the
meaning of discrimination in my case, administrative reform within the context of stat-
utes and the regulatory state in his. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that this differ-
ence explains all of our disagreement. For example, a case can be made that detailed
structural injunctions are more appropriate in enforcing congressional statutes than in
securing constitutional rights, See note 10 supra, precisely because the courts are en-
forcing the majority's will in the former and therefore are directly subject to congres-
sional control should there be any disagreement over the rights and remedies, costs and
benefits as measured by the courts.
46. This idea is insightfully developed in a student note. NoteJudicial Right Declara-
tion and Entrenched Discrimination, 94 YALE L. J. - (forthcoming May 1985).
47. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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originally pleaded and proved only a violation within the center city
and therefore refused to review the broader proof and findings in
the trial court because the court of appeals had not addressed this
issue. 48 As a result, the majority was able to proclaim that a Detroit-
only violation authorized only a Detroit-only, not an "interdistrict
remedy." 4 9 The Court thereby sought to absolve white America
from responsibility for the ghetto. 50
The tragedy in all of this for Peter Schuck is that his thoughtful
proposals for governmental liability for damages and for caution in
ordering too detailed structural remedies have little chance of suc-
cess if our thinking is limited primarily to private law models and the
theory of bureaucratic organization. On that terrain technical argu-
48. Compare Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 723, 728 n. 7, 745-746, 752 with H. WILKINSON,
FROM Brown To Bakke: LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 786-845, 1219-1235 (1974); cf Dimond supra note 39, at 39-41 &
note 154.
49. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 737-53. But see Hills v. Gautreauz, 425 U.S. 284, 299
(1976); and Dimond, supra note 39 at 39-41 and n. 154. Schuck's similar focus on the
micro-level of implementation and bureaucratic behavior may also obscure understand-
ing of the constitutional wrong at issue and the problems associated with some school
desegregation decrees. See, e.g., pp. 164, 168 (arguing that judicial treatment of Boston
school case led to white flight in Boston). Consider, for example, the possibility that the
basic wrong at issue in the Boston school case is not the extent and continuing effect
within the local school district of particular acts of intentional segregation by Boston
school authorities but a much wider-ranging, governmentally fostered and condoned
system of racial ghettoization throughout the greater Boston area for which the state
bears ultimate responsibility under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, generally, Dimond
supra note 39. Because the legal landscape of today has been so much shaped by the
atomistic views following Ex Parte Young, however, the lawyers, the judges, the Boston
school officials, the media, the State, the President, the Congress, and Professor Schuck
confine their thinking and energies to the acts of Boston school authorities and school
segregation within Boston. From this context, the wonders are (a) that there have been
so few cases of massive resistance to city-only school desegregation decrees and (b) that
"white flight" (i.e., the flight of white persons to virtually all-white suburbs and private
schools when a center city desegregates its schools) has not increased more dramatically.
Isn't it possible that the lesson of such cases has less to do with the mechanics of struc-
turing injunctions and more to do with how we as a people (and our judges who are
supposedly independent fact-finders and interpreters of the meaning of the state duty to
afford equal protection of the laws to all persons) think about coming to grips with such
basic issues as the meaning of the continuing racial separation in contemporary
America?
50. H. WILKINSON, supra note 48, at 242; also P. DIMOND, supra note 13 at 26-118,
391-402 (forthcoming 1985). Ironically, the court had the opportunity in Milliken I to
consider only the area-wide nature of the violation because the Court of Appeals had
already vacated the area-wide remedy contemplated by the district court. Bradley v.
Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1973).
306
Vol. 3:295, 1984
Telling Government What's Right
ments advocating basic reform are simply doomed. The perspec-
tives of public responsibility and transforming national values must
be added if Schuck's ideas are to be considered seriously on their
actual merits in our time.51
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51. Schuck does not omit consideration of these two additional perspectives. pp.
167-168. My fear, however, is that his emphases on private law and bureaucratic behav-
ior do not fully illuminate the compelling need to reconsider the critical issues of gov-
ernmental responsibility for damages and the appropriate nature and function ofjudicially framed declarations and other equitable remedies for structural violations.

